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The NAFTA: Its Overarching
Implications
On December 17, 1992, U.S. President George Bush, Mexican President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari, and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney signed the trilateral
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The seed idea for NAFTA-type
agreements was planted during the campaign and presidency of Ronald Reagan, who
frequently expressed his support for a North American accord.1
The first free trade agreements with Israel in 1984-85 and Canada in 1987-
88 germinated from this seed in the first and second Reagan administrations. The
Israeli agreement principally reflects the special political relationship between the
United States and Israel; the Canadian agreement (CFTA), on the other hand,
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General Counsel, and Chair of the Section 301 Committee of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive (1985-89); and Deputy (for Policy) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import
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1. For example, in a 1986 radio address to the nation, President Reagan said, "During my 1980
campaign for office, I called for a North American accord-a renewed spirit of friendship and
cooperation between the United States, Mexico, and Canada, the three great nations which share this
continent." 22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 16 (Jan. 4, 1986).
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reflects the economic relationship between the United States, the largest market
for Canada, and Canada, America's largest trading partner. U.S. Trade Represen-
tative Clayton Yeutter compared "the historic significance of the [CFTA], in the
economic sphere .... to the historic significance of the U.S.-Soviet arms control
treaty in the national security arena." 2
The Bush administration further developed the CFTA concept by establishing,
in the NAFTA, a free trade area from the Yukon to the Yucatan. President Salinas
initially spearheaded these negotiations, which were based largely upon CFTA
foundations. In June 1990, President Bush joined President Salinas in endorsing
the negotiation of a U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement. In February 1991, the
two presidents, joined by Prime Minister Mulroney, announced their intention to
negotiate a trilateral NAFTA.
In order for the negotiated agreement to be considered by the U.S. Congress under
"fast-track" negotiating procedures, 3 President Bush requested, on March 1, 1991,
a two-year extension of fast track. The issue was strenuously lobbied and debated
in Congress, but ultimately Congress extended the fast-track procedure. As part of
that process, on May 1, 1991, President Bush pledged to Congress that, among other
things, he would address environmental, labor standards, and worker rights issues.
For the United States, the negotiations presented an opportunity to achieve U.S.
economic objectives, such as expanding sales opportunities for U.S. companies
exporting to Mexico, locking in recent Mexican market-opening initiatives, and
enhancing North American international competitiveness by permitting compa-
nies to set up operations where it would be most profitable economically, without
the distortions caused by trade or investment barriers. With respect to U.S.
foreign policy objectives, the NAFTA was expected to help achieve an historic
reconciliation with Mexico; enhance U.S. ability to address a wide range of issues,
including illegal immigration, narcotics, environmental protection, and conflicts
in Central America; and send a strong and encouraging signal throughout the
hemisphere regarding the U.S. commitment to freer trade and open markets.4
For Mexico, this endeavor represented a turning point in its relations with the
United States. In sitting down at the bargaining table with the United States,
Mexico turned its back on decades of nationalism and economic autarky. Mexico's
willingness to negotiate confirmed its recent commitment to market principles.
Canada's government officials faced continuing criticism from opponents of
the CFTA, which was blamed for virtually every economic difficulty facing the
country. At least in the United States, Canada's participation in the NAFTA
negotiations appeared to be largely a defensive maneuver to ensure that the
2. JUDITH H. BELLO & ALAN F. HOLMER, GUIDE TO THE U.S.-CANADA FREE-TRADE
AGREEMENT at xi (Supp. 1991).
3. Under the fast-track procedure the Congress agrees to vote on a bill submitted by the President
to implement trade agreements on a fixed time schedule, not subject to any amendments.
4. Robert B. Zoellick, North American Free Trade Agreement; Extending the Fast-Track Negoti-
ating Authority, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 1991.
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NAFTA did not dilute the Canadian benefits of the CFTA. If Canada had remained
on the sidelines and a U.S. -Mexico bilateral FTA had been consummated, the
result would have been only one North American country with duty-free access
to all of North America-the United States. Canada had no desire to be a mere
spoke on a wheel with the United States as the hub. Canada concluded that it could
benefit from better access to the Mexican market, while preserving its access to
the United States, far and away its largest trading partner.
Once the U.S. Congress had extended fast-track procedures, on June 12, 1991,
trade ministers Carla A. Hills (United States), Jaime Serra Puche (Mexico), and
Michael Wilson (Canada) met in Toronto and formally launched the negotiations.
The first plenary session of chief negotiators5 and their delegations was held in
Washington on July 8-9, 1991. Negotiations were long and difficult, with officials
from each country addressing their respective political problems.
On August 12, 1992, following marathon negotiations over several weeks,
President Bush announced that negotiations had been completed. The NAFTA
was expected to create a massive open market with over 360 million consumers
and over $6 trillion in annual output. 6 As described more fully in other articles
in this issue, the NAFTA phases out all tariffs and other barriers to trade in goods
and services in North America, reduces barriers to investment, and strengthens
protection for intellectual property rights.
While a few commentators questioned the economic benefits of the agreement
to the United States, the vast majority believed the agreement would promote U.S.
economic interests. Arguments of supporters of the agreement were enhanced by
the experience with the U.S.-Canada FTA, under which U.S. exports to Canada
expanded by $12.9 billion between 1988 and 1992,7 and by the experience follow-
ing Mexico's unilateral market-opening initiatives in 1986. U.S. exports to Mex-
ico expanded from $12.4 billion in 1986 to $37.2 billion in 1992, transforming
a U.S. trade deficit with Mexico of $4.9 billion in 1986 to a trade surplus of $4.9
billion in 1992.8 The United States has much to gain from expanded trade with
Mexico. Since 70 percent of Mexican imports come from the United States,
Mexico is the fastest-growing major U.S. market. 9 Exports to Mexico currently
support 600,000 U.S. jobs;' ° and export-related jobs generally pay 17 percent
more per hour than the average U.S. wage."
5. Julius L. Katz for the United States, Herminio Blanco Mendoza for Mexico, and John Weekes
for Canada.
6. White House Fact Sheet: The North American Free Trade Agreement, 28 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1424 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
7. Foreign Trade Div., Bureau of the Census, U.S. Merchandise Trade (Jan. 28, 1993) (data
in unpublished format), and U.S. MERCHANDISE TRADE Ex. 12 (Nov. 1992). All data for 1992 are
cumulative for January through November.
8. Id.
9. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, OVERVIEW: THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT (Aug. 1992).
10. Fact Sheet, supra note 8, at 1426.
11. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 9.
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On September 18, 1992, President Bush formally notified Congress of his
intent to sign the NAFTA on behalf of the United States. Already, though, the
NAFTA had become an issue in the 1992 presidential campaign. House Majority
Leader Richard Gephardt criticized the agreement and urged the Bush administra-
tion to return to the negotiating table. 2 For his part, President Bush criticized the
Democratic presidential nominee, then-Governor Clinton, for waffling on the
issue. 13 In a major address at North Carolina State University on October 4, 1992,
Governor Clinton declared his general support for the NAFTA, stating that the
NAFTA could be a positive force for America's economy. However, he qualified
his support as contingent on "additional agreements to protect America's vital
interests," including those relating to environmental protection and worker stan-
dards and safety. 14 Since his election, President Clinton has reiterated his resolves
in this regard.15
The NAFTA already has had a significant impact on the economics of North
America and the future direction of U.S. international economic policy. The
symposium articles in this NAFTA issue of The International Lawyer address
those aspects of the NAFTA that most dramatically expand the frontiers of interna-
tional trade law and policy: intellectual property protection, trade in services,
investment and the resolution of investment disputes, procedures for settling other
disputes, the linkage of trade and environmental issues, and rules of origin and
customs procedures. These articles briefly describe key provisions, compare them
to precedents, and analyze their significance. Additionally, two articles review
various perspectives on the most controversial aspects of the NAFTA: its overall
treatment of labor and environmental issues.
This article focuses on the NAFTA as a whole, whose significance, in the
authors' opinion, far exceeds the sum of its parts. In the authors' view, the
NAFTA has seven overarching implications for international trade law and policy
through: the model it provides for economic cooperation between developed
and developing countries; its encouragement of global as well as regional trade
liberalization; its precedent-setting and far-reaching regime for protection of intel-
lectual property rights; its closer linkage between trade, labor, and environmental
issues; its potentially negative impact on the willingness of Congress to extend
fast-track legislative procedures to future international trade negotiations; the
12. In a Sept. 9, 1992, speech to labor, environmental, and consumer groups, Gephardt said, "If
the President values the strategic relationship America has with Mexico, he should lead the effort to
renegotiate NAFTA, and not pursue to an unhappy conclusion the final disposition of this flawed
agreement." Gephardt Criticizes Auto, Electronics and Energy Provisions in NAFTA, INSiDE U.S.
TRADE, Sept. 11, 1992, at 2.
13. Remarks to Public Safety Equipment Employees in St. Louis, Missouri, 28 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1520 (Aug. 31, 1992) (Speech by President George Bush).
14. Governor Bill Clinton, Remarks at the Student Center at North Carolina State University,
Raleigh, N.C. (Oct. 4, 1992).
15. Clinton Still Seeks NAFTA Improvements on Labor, Environment, Spokesman Says, INSiDE
U.S. TRADE, Nov. 13, 1992, at 1, 15.
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extent to which the NAFTA symbolizes the internationalization of America's
domestic economic agenda; and, finally, the strengthening of the relationship
between the United States and Mexico.
I. The NAFTA Exemplifies Reciprocal, Mutually Advantageous
Cooperation Between Developed and Developing Countries
During the Cold War, tensions between East and West dominated the geopoliti-
cal stage. Developing countries provided the set for battles between anti-
Communists and Communists, or received major attention only when courted by
one or both of the superpowers in their struggle against each other.
In the post-Cold War era, some observers initially feared that the developing
world would lose even this measure of attention. With the disintegration of the
former Soviet Union, economic recession in the United States, a stagnant economy
in Japan, the reunification of Germany, and the strengthening of the European
Communities, some were concerned that the developed countries would become
increasingly self-absorbed, and the gap between the rich and poor nations of the
world would widen.
President Bush's decision in December 1992, supported by the United Nations,
to send American troops into Somalia diminished such fears and restored hope
throughout the developing world. While Somalia was a special case because of
the absence of any effective government there, the unprecedented action of the
United States to intervene for purely humanitarian reasons presaged a renewed
interest in conditions in the Third World.
While the temporary, U.N.-backed intervention of the United States in Somalia
was an extraordinary case, the NAFTA could serve as an example, with potentially
broad application, of pragmatic cooperation between developed and developing
countries for their mutual economic, political, and social advantage. For the first
time the United States has reached out to integrate its economy more closely with
that of a developing nation. For the first time Mexico-which, until the mid- 1980s,
did not join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, practiced autarky, and
was wary of the United States-reached out to the United States for closer,
mutually profitable economic relations.
Cooperation today between developed and developing countries is critical. As
President Clinton stressed in his inaugural address, many problems of the world
are global in their scope: "the world economy, the world environment, the world
AIDS crisis, the world arms race."- 16 Neither pollution, nor AIDS, nor hunger
respects national boundaries. To rise to such borderless challenges, developed
and developing countries must link hands and share the responsibility for resolving
these problems, as well as the benefits of such resolutions.
16. "This Is Our Time. Let Us Embrace It.", WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1993, at A26 (text of President
Clinton's Inaugural Address).
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The NAFTA provides a model for such cooperation. By obtaining access to a
larger market for its products and services in the United States and Canada,
Mexico can develop its economy, benefit from greater economies of scale, and
enhance its competitiveness and sophistication in markets around the globe. Addi-
tionally, by opening its market to products and services of the United States and
Canada, Mexico enables its consumers to enjoy a broader range of choices and
its industries to enjoy access to world-class inputs at competitive prices. By tearing
down barriers to foreign investment and agreeing to protect patents, copyrights,
trademarks, and other intellectual property rights, Mexico can increase its re-
search, development, and consequently, its innovation, thereby providing more
jobs. Finally, with the increased revenues generated by more productive economic
activity throughout North America, each of the three sovereign governments
better positions itself to achieve its national objectives, including upgrading its
infrastructure, and better protecting the health and well-being of its people and
their environment.
President Bush's Agenda for American Renewal called for extension of the
NAFTA to, or similar arrangements with, countries in South America, Asia, and
Europe.17 As of his inauguration, President Clinton had not been as specific about
his plans for legislatively implementing the NAFTA or extending it to other
nations.
Nonetheless, the NAFTA has potential significance well beyond North
America. If developed and developing nations can join hands on this continent,
their economic cooperation can be replicated or adapted in other parts of the
world. Other free trade agreements spurred by, and perhaps based upon, the
NAFTA may facilitate the sense of shared responsibility and common destiny
that should enable the global community to confront the borderless problems
threatening us all.
II. The NAFTA May Encourage Global as
Well as Regional Trade Liberalization
Some NAFTA critics have been concerned about what they perceive as poten-
tially adverse effects on multilateral efforts to liberalize trade, such as the Uruguay
Round multilateral trade negotiations. These critics assess the NAFTA as primar-
ily a defensive response to regional trade liberalization within the European Com-
munities (as through the Single Market initiative and the Maastricht Treaty) and,
to a lesser extent, in Asia (through extensive Japanese investment in and assistance
to many Asian developing countries). They believe that instead of fashioning a
regional trading bloc, the NAFTA nations should reinvigorate the GATT and
17. President Bush's Agenda for American Renewal, Oct. 1991, states (at 9):
Free people and free markets develop hand in hand .... We need to start to develop a strategic network of free
trade agreements . . . across the Atlantic and the Pacific and in our own hemisphere. . . . If we are to be a true
export superpower, we cannot be tied down to one region.
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multilateral trade negotiations from which the United States will benefit far more
substantially.
Without question, the United States would benefit dramatically more from a
successfully concluded Uruguay Round than the NAFTA. Bush administration
Trade Representative Carla A. Hills, whose team negotiated the NAFTA, was
the first to stress that the gains of the NAFTA to the United States are quite modest
compared to the prospects of global trade liberalization.
Regrettably, however, multilateral trade negotiations among over one hundred
nations are slower than talks among a few trading partners. Developing a consen-
sus or making trade-offs between conflicting positions is simply more cumber-
some than a trade agreement between a select few. Finally, multilateral trade
negotiations necessarily suffer from a least common denominator phenomenon-
the ability to achieve only that level of trade liberalization that is acceptable to
virtually all the nations participating.
In view of these difficulties, it may not be surprising that the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round is overdue. Negotiators had scheduled it to be concluded,
politically, if not legally and technically, at a meeting of trade and other ministers
in Brussels in December 1990. Despite persistent and vigorous efforts, the Bush
administration was unable to reach acceptable agreements in Geneva before it left
office early this year. Understandably, the Clinton administration was unable to
do so before the fast-track procedures for legislative implementation of trade
agreements expired this spring. Therefore, the Clinton administration now needs
to obtain a reenactment of the fast-track procedures to facilitate its multilateral,
and any new plurilateral or bilateral, trade negotiations.
In fact, the NAFTA is likely to facilitate, rather than impede, global trade
liberalization. First, the negotiation of the NAFTA and its legislative implementa-
tion function as a safeguard in international trade. Frustrations in the U.S. admin-
istration, Congress, and private sector resulting from the continuing impasse in
the Uruguay Round are muted to some degree by the success of the NAFTA. This
effect enables the U.S. Government, at least temporarily, to be more patient and
to better weather the stalemate in Geneva. It also helps the United States to avoid
overreacting-as through the enactment of legislation calling for unilateral U.S.
action, possibly in violation of U.S. obligations under the GATT-to the GATT's
sluggish pace and seemingly intractable differences among contracting parties.
Such action could be counterproductive to the GATT trade liberalization talks.
In short, the NAFTA may be perceived as buying more time in which to conclude
the Uruguay Round by providing interim trade liberalization within North
America.
Second, the NAFTA provides more leverage to U.S. trade negotiators in the
GATT talks. In particular, concerns of developing countries about the competitive
advantage that the NAFTA provides Mexico in the U.S. market may provoke
them to try to accommodate U.S. negotiating objectives in Geneva. By paving
another, albeit smaller, freer trade frontier, the NAFTA may energize trade
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liberalization in Geneva among developing countries; for example, by encourag-
ing certain less developed countries to be more forthcoming on intellectual prop-
erty protection or to provide more access to their markets for products and ser-
vices.
In the authors' opinion, the conclusion of the NAFTA does not threaten degen-
eration into polarized regional trading blocs. United States industry does not
intend to limit its customers, suppliers, financiers, or joint venturers to either
North America or this hemisphere. The United States needs access to markets all
over the globe and therefore will strive to achieve that access through multilateral
trade liberalization. However, interim regional trade liberalization can buy more
time to conclude the multilateral talks satisfactorily and provide more leverage
to U.S. negotiators in the process.
III. The NAFTA Establishes, for the First Time, a World-Class Legal
Regime for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
Former U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills once called intellectual property
the "fire of our genius.',' 8 Our founding fathers considered patent protection
sufficiently important to warrant specific mention in the Constitution. Indeed, one
of our foremost founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson, was the first superintendent
of our patent system and the first patent examiner. An intellectual and political
pioneer in a frontier land, Jefferson (himself an inventor of a swivel chair, pedom-
eter, and camp stool, among other inventions) appreciated how innovation could
facilitate progress and the economic development of the early United States.
Over two hundred years later intellectual property is even more important
in the United States. The United States has lost its comparative advantage for
labor-intensive goods, but it retains that advantage for high technology goods and
many services (such as entertainment), in part because it stimulates innovation
and creativity through effective protection of intellectual property rights.
The official State Department publication listing treaties and agreements of the
United States, Treaties in Force, includes numerous international agreements for
the protection of intellectual property rights. However, a chief objective of the
United States in the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations was (and is)
to establish a world-class comprehensive legal regime for the protection of all
intellectual property rights.
The NAFTA negotiations were not launched until 1991, yet the three participat-
ing governments were able to conclude them-including a landmark chapter on
intellectual property rights-the very next year. This chapter is the first compre-
hensive international agreement to provide such high levels of protection. It may
serve as the model for intellectual property agreements in the future.
18. Ambassador Carla Hills, Intellectual Property Rights: Fueling the Fire of Genius, Address
before the Foundation for a Creative America (May 9, 1990).
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Indeed, in 1991 Mexico dramatically improved its protection of intellectual
property rights within Mexico. Even before the NAFTA negotiations were under-
way, Mexico unilaterally enacted a new law designed largely to attract investors to
Mexico and to stimulate research, development, and innovation within Mexico. '9
However important this reform, a subsequent Mexican Government would have
been free to regress in this regard, unless the new, high levels of intellectual
property protection were part of an international agreement. By including intellec-
tual property protection in the NAFTA, Mexico has taken steps to prevent any
subsequent Mexican Government from turning the clock back on this subject.
Finally, by achieving a high-water mark agreement on intellectual property
protection with Mexico, the United States is more likely to achieve acceptable
outcomes in its bilateral intellectual property negotiations with other developing
countries. Having achieved a satisfactory agreement with one developing country,
the United States enjoys more leverage in its negotiations with others. 20
IV. The NAFTA Opens the Door to More Closely Integrated
Treatment of Trade, Labor, and Environmental Issues
Organized labor and some in the environmental community generally opposed
the NAFTA negotiations. Organized labor opposed the NAFTA from its incep-
tion. Further, virtually all environmental groups were concerned that growth in
trade with Mexico could jeopardize the environment, both along the U.S. -Mexi-
can border and in Mexico. A few, more extreme environmental groups opposed
the NAFTA outright. Other, more moderate groups supported the economic and
trade growth the NAFTA was intended to stimulate, on the condition that the
NAFTA did not sacrifice environmental objectives for developmental objectives.
President Bush provided assurances that the NAFTA would not jeopardize
workers or the environment. In an Action Plan submitted on May 1, 1991, he
made commitments regarding environmental protection in any NAFTA his admin-
istration would negotiate.2 In particular, he stressed that U.S. health, safety, and
environmental standards would not be compromised and that the NAFTA would
not dilute U.S. minimum standards in these areas. He also agreed to address
bilateral environmental issues separately, but concurrently, with the NAFTA
talks.
The debate on the NAFTA implementing bill President Clinton is expected to
submit to Congress will likely focus intently on the NAFTA's effects on worker
19. Ley de Fomento y Protecci6n de la Propiedad Industrial, D.O. (June 27, 1991).
20. For example, the United States has a long list of Priority Watch List and Watch List countries
that are candidates for being named priority foreign countries under the Special 301 provisions. Trade
Act of 1974, § 182 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988)). The designation of a country
as a priority foreign country triggers a bilateral negotiation.
21. See COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS., EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON ISSUES
CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATIONS OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Comm. Print
1991).
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adjustment and environmental protection. President Clinton endorsed the NAFTA
in principle during the presidential campaign, but indicated that he would seek
to negotiate three supplemental agreements, including better protection of U.S.
workers and the environment.22
For better and worse, the linkage generated between trade laws and negotia-
tions, on the one hand, and labor and environmental issues, on the other, is
probably here to stay. While ample precedents existed for the trade-labor link-
age, 23 the linkage with environmental issues is relatively new.
2 4
For better, this linkage could be used to facilitate accomplishment of more U.S.
goals on the labor and environmental agendas. For worse, this linkage could
effectively undermine accomplishment of U.S. trade objectives. As Senator Dan-
forth stated at U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor's confirmation hearing
before the Senate Finance Committee:
I am concerned that too much else gets loaded on our trade negotiators; too much else
meaning too many other national purposes in addition to expanding our ability to sell
in the markets of other countries .... I think that is using trade policy in order to
accomplish other very good purposes, but the result is to subsume trade policy under
other things .... Obviously, everybody wants a clean environment, everybody wants
fair labor practices, but when NAFTA trade negotiations are used to accomplish extrane-
ous things, then trade becomes secondary, not primary.25
In any event, the NAFTA is the watershed development dramatically linking
trade and environmental issues. For better and worse, it augurs similar linkage
in other international trade negotiations and agreements (including the next round
of GATT multilateral negotiations).
V. The NAFTA May Imperil the Fast-Track Procedures
Vital to International Trade Negotiations
The launching of the NAFTA negotiations required an extension of fast-track
legislative procedures, which otherwise would have expired for any trade
agreement not notified by the President to the Congress by midnight on March
22. Governor Bill Clinton, supra note 14. Governor Clinton said:
I will not sign legislation implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement until we have reached additional
agreements to protect America's vital interests. But I believe we can address these issues without renegotiating the
basic agreement .... [Wle do have to insist that protection for our workers, for the environment, proceeds on
parallel tracks.
23. For example, art. XIX of the GATT authorizes "safeguard measures" where increased
imports of particular products cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers. Moreover,
certain U.S. laws contain labor-related provisions, including the Generalized System of Preferences
(Trade Act of 1974, § 502(c)(7) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(7) (1988)), and section
301 (Trade Act of 1974, § 301(d)(3)(B)(iii) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(d)(3)(B)(iii)
(1988)).
24. See generally Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, Trade and the Environment: A Snapshot
from Tuna/Dolphins to the NAFTA and Beyond, 27 INT'L LAW. 169 (1993).
25. COMM. ON FINANCE, CONFIRMATION HEARING OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE-DESIGNATE
MICKEY KANTOR (Jan. 19, 1993).
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1, 1991. Since negotiations then had only begun, President Bush requested the
extension of fast-track procedures for two years.26
Ultimately Congress granted the President's request; House and Senate resolu-
tions disapproving the request were handily defeated, 192-231 in the House 27 and
36-59 in the Senate.2 a However, the final votes belie the controversy that the
fast-track extension request provoked.
This controversy was generated in part by the substance of the negotiations-
anticipated trade concessions by the United States. However, U.S. procedures
also fanned the controversy; the fast-track consideration of a bill to implement
the NAFTA on a fixed timetable, without amendments, curtailed normal preroga-
tives of members of Congress, particularly in the Senate.29
The fast-track procedures have been applied three times prior to the NAFTA:
to implement the GATT Tokyo Round agreements in 1979, 30 the U.S.-Israel
Free-Trade Agreement in 1985,31 and the U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement
in 1988.32 However, in these earlier uses, relatively few understood that the fast
track was subject to amendment by the House of Representatives or Senate at any
time.33
Moreover, by the time of the NAFTA negotiations in 1991, more members of
Congress recognized the importance of international trade rules in an increasingly
global economy. As trade became a higher priority on the American agenda, more
members became interested in exercising power regarding the negotiation and
application of trade rules.
Just as more members were becoming interested in trade negotiations, more
congressional committees acquired jurisdiction over such negotiations as the trade
agenda swelled to cover virtually the entire spectrum of economic activities. When
trade negotiations involved only tariff levels, the Senate Finance and House Ways
and Means Committees enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction. However, as trade was
defined more broadly to include trade in services, protection of intellectual prop-
26. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1103(b) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 2903(b) (1990)).
27. 137 CoNo. Rac. H3588 (daily ed. May 23, 1991).
28. Id. at S6829 (daily ed. May 24, 1991).
29. See generally Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, The Fast Track Debate: A Prescription for
Pragmatism, 26 INT'L LAW. 183 (1992).
30. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. 2501 (1988)).
31. The United States-Israel Free-Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-47,
99 Stat. 82 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note (1988)).
32. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note (1990)).
33. The fast track is set forth in the Trade Act of 1974, § 151(a)(1) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 2191(a)(1) (1988)), which enacts rules of the Congress "as an exercise of the rulemaking
power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively .... "Id. Under the Constitution,
"[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. Conse-
quently, the Constitution authorizes each body to establish and modify its own rules, even if they
depart from the fast-track rule set forth in the Trade Act.
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erty rights, investment, and standards, nearly every other congressional commit-
tee achieved jurisdiction over some aspect of the negotiations. As committee
chairmen and ranking members gained jurisdiction, they came to view, perhaps
jealously, the special position that the Finance and Ways and Means Committees
enjoyed under fast-track procedures (because of their oversight of the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative).
Thus, President Bush's request in 1991 for a two-year extension of the fast
track provoked harsh criticism of the procedure itself. A few members suggested
the fast track was unconstitutional. Most opponents accepted its lawful basis, but
complained that the fast track required the Congress to "abrogate," "abdicate,"
"surrender," or "relinquish" congressional power.34
Supporters of the fast track argued, however, that it was necessary to achieve
international trade agreements. As Senator Danforth summarized:
[I]t is the overwhelming opinion of people who know anything about international trade
that without fast track there is no possibility of a trade agreement. It is just not going
to happen .... Carla Hills says she has been told by her negotiating partners, forget
it, we are not even going to talk to you.35
Ultimately, of course, Congress did not disapprove President Bush's request
to extend the fast track procedures. However, each new use of the fast track
renders the procedure more fragile and subject to harsher criticism. The contro-
versy generated by the NAFTA implementing bill in particular could jeopardize
the availability of these critical procedures for future international trade
agreements.
VI. The NAFTA Symbolizes the Internationalization
of the Domestic Agenda
In today's global economy, isolating the domestic agenda of the United States
from its international agenda is difficult, if not impossible. In the post-Cold War
era, economic policy will be a higher priority in formulating U.S. foreign policy.
Now more than ever, U.S.-based corporations seek access to markets around
the globe, and the U.S. investments of foreign-based corporations provide the
necessary capital to fuel our economic engines during prolonged federal budget
deficits and create much-needed U.S. jobs. Moreover, as President Clinton
stressed in his inaugural address, many problems plaguing the United States do
not respect national boundaries, but migrate freely across them.
The NAFTA emblemizes the internationalization of America's domestic
agenda. For example:
* The United States seeks to be more competitive in today's global market;
thus, the NAFTA provides greater access to North American markets and
rules for ensuring the fairness of such access.
34. See generally Holmer & Bello, supra note 29, at 192.
35. 137 CONG. REC. S6623 (daily ed. May 23, 1992).
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" The United States places a higher priority today on the protection of the
environment; thus, the NAFTA establishes a dramatic precedent for linking
international trade and environmental issues.
" The United States promotes worker rights and fair treatment of workers;
thus, the NAFTA protects against any lowering of U.S. labor standards, in
particular health and occupational and safety standards for workers.
The NAFTA thus exemplifies how interwoven are the domestic and international
objectives of the United States in a global economy united by electronic media.
VII. The NAFTA Cements the New Relationship Between the United
States and Mexico, and Presages the Course of U.S. Foreign Policy
in the Twenty-First Century
Mexico's President Salinas first proposed to negotiate a free trade agreement
with the United States. Additionally, Mexico rejected autarky and began opening
its market unilaterally, even prior to the NAFTA negotiations. Thus, Mexico
deserves ample credit for its leadership in a new, more productive, and less
confrontational relationship with the United States. At the urging of President
Salinas and with the eager acceptance of President Bush, the NAFTA enshrines
this new relationship in an international trade agreement.
Consequently, the NAFTA symbolizes a new approach in foreign policy-an
approach well suited to the demise of the Cold War and the era of superpowers.
In the twenty-first century, neither other developed nations (such as the European
Communities and Japan) nor developing nations will need the United States as
much for protection against Communist aggression. While the world will remain
a dangerous place, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has spawned widespread
national self-absorption and a higher priority for national economic objectives.
In this climate reciprocal market access agreements that strengthen foreign policy
alliances while promoting mutually advantageous economic interests are likely to
proliferate.
VIH. Conclusion
The following articles in this issue of The International Lawyer describe in
detail and analyze the significance of the pioneering provisions of the NAFTA.
While each of these breakthroughs is individually significant, the importance of
the NAFTA as a whole far exceeds the sum of its parts. Beyond its immediate
application, the NAFTA warrants scrutiny because of its precedent for coopera-
tion between developed and developing countries, encouragement of global as
well as regional trade liberalization, comprehensive protection of intellectual
property rights, linkage between trade and nontrade issues, revelation of the
fragility of fast-track procedures, internationalization of America's domestic
agenda, and the new economic content of U.S. foreign policymaking.
As Canada joined in the negotiations, the prospect of a free trade area from the
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Yukon to the Yucatan drove negotiators to explore and find common ground on
the entire range of economic activities, from trade in products and services to the
protection of intellectual property rights, investment, and the environment. The
trail-blazing breadth of the NAFTA ensures a well-rounded and complex relation-
ship between participating trading partners, most likely to realize its potential and
enhance the competitiveness of North American producers and workers in a global
economy.
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